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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA")1 was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against
false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, unconscionable
actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical
procedures to secure such protection."'2 The most recent amendments,
enacted in 1995 by the 74th Texas Legislature, govern all causes of action
accruing on or after September 1, 1995, and all causes of action filed on
or after September 1, 1996, regardless of when they accrued. In enacting
the 1995 amendments, the Legislature introduced new restrictions on the
DTPA's applicability to nonresidential transactions involving large dollar
amounts and to professional services. Few judicial decisions during the
survey period involved these changes to the statute's coverage. Four
years after the amendments, there are still no reported cases discussing
the exclusion of nonresidential transactions involving substantial dollar
amounts ($100,000 in cases involving a written contract, and $500,000 in
all such cases irrespective of the existence of a contract) 3 from the stat-
ute's coverage.
This survey covers significant developments under the DTPA from Oc-
tober 1, 1998 through September 30, 1999. Noteworthy decisions during
the survey period address consumer status, the proper measure of dam-
ages, and defenses to DTPA claims.
II. CONSUMER STATUS
Several of the more interesting decisions during the Survey period in-
volve the requirement that the plaintiff be a "consumer" as that term is
defined in the statute. 4 To qualify as a consumer, the plaintiff must be an
individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, goods or services;
further, those goods or services must form the basis of the plaintiff's com-
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2000) [here-
inafter DTPA].
2. Id. § 17.44(a).
3. See id. § 17.49(f), (g).
4. See id. § 17.50.
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plaint.5 Whether a plaintiff qualifies for DTPA consumer status is a ques-
tion of law.6
A. THE PLAINTIFF'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE TRANSACTION
Consumer status under the DTPA depends upon a showing that the
plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles him to relief.7 In Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Haney,8 a life insurance agent brought
DTPA claims against MetLife complaining of inaccurate policy illustra-
tions generated by computer software that MetLife sold to its agents. Be-
cause Haney did not know how to use the software, he obtained the
policy illustrations in question from a MetLife branch manager who gen-
erated them using the software.9 After Haney prevailed at trial, MetLife
appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to support a finding that Haney was a consumer under the DTPA. Haney
responded that although he had not purchased the computer software,
MetLife intended for the software to be purchased and used by its agents
primarily for their benefit.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals recognized that when an employer
purchases goods or services for the benefit of its employee, that employee
has consumer status under the DTPA for claims arising from those goods
or services. 10 Nevertheless, the court reversed the jury's verdict because
the evidence showed that MetLife's goal in developing and selling the
software was to increase the sales of its products, not to benefit its
agents."1 The court did not attempt to explain how the two motivations
were inconsistent, and from the court's opinion they did not appear to be.
Another example is Moritz v. Bueche,12 in which former law students
of a defunct law school sued the father of the school's manager. The
students alleged that the defendant and his son represented to them,
among other things, that attendance at the school would qualify them to
take the Texas bar exam, that the school soon would be qualified to con-
fer juris doctor degrees, that law books had been or would be purchased,
and that professional faculty would be hired. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, which argued that the stu-
dents could not establish that they were consumers as to the father. 13
5. See id. § 17.45(4); see also Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-
52 (Tex. 1987).
6. See Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
7. See Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see also
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
8. 987 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
9. See id. at 238-39.
10. See id. at 242.
11. See id. at 243.
12. 980 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
13. See id. at 851.
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Reversing, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held:
Consumer status under the DTPA is defined by the plaintiff's rela-
tionship to the goods or services, not by his relationship to his oppo-
nent. It is enough that the defendant have a relationship to the
transaction and enjoy the benefits of that transaction. While the Stu-
dents have not conclusively proven that [the father] has done so, the
evidence that some payments were sent to [the father's] business,
that he personally thanked students for enrolling in the school, and
that he assumed a management position in his son's absence pointed
out evidence that raised a fact issue on this element of their DTPA
claim.14
Although this language seems to confuse consumer standing with the
principles that determine a defendant's liability in the absence of strict
contractual privity, the result seems correct in light of the relationship
between the plaintiffs, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct. 15
Guest v. Cochran16 involved a malpractice claim arising under the pre-
1995 version of the DTPA. The plaintiff's parents had hired an attorney
to perform estate planning services. After his parents' death, the plaintiff
sued the attorney alleging, among other things, that the attorney was neg-
ligent and violated the DTPA by failing to include an estate planning
mechanism to allow the estate to avoid paying taxes. Plaintiff also al-
leged that upon the death of the plaintiff's father, failing to advise the
plaintiff's mother or the executors of his father's estate that the mother
could disclaim a portion of her inheritance and thus avoid paying taxes.
The trial court granted the attorney's motion for summary judgment, in
which he argued that the plaintiff individually lacked privity and con-
sumer status. 17 Affirming, the Houston Court of Appeals observed that
the DTPA does not require contractual privity because the relevant in-
quiry is the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction. 18 The court also
acknowledged that a plaintiff may be a consumer of legal services absent
privity if a third party purchased the services for the plaintiff's benefit. 19
The court held, however, that "[a]ny benefit derived by the beneficiaries
of a will from the estate work provided by an attorney is purely inciden-
tal."' 20 Because the plaintiff's relationship to the will was one of benefici-
ary, he was not a consumer of the attorney's services, and summary
judgment was properly granted.21
Finally, in Flameout Design & Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian
14. Id. at 855 (citations omitted).
15. See Sanchez, 187 F.3d at 491.
16. 993 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The 1995 amend-
ments to the DTPA exempt from the application of the statute most claims arising from the
rendition of legal services. See id. at 407 n.8. Because Guest was filed prior to September
1, 1996, those amendments did not apply. See id.
17. The plaintiff also raised claims in his capacity as co-independent executor of his
parents' estate.
18. See Guest, 993 S.W.2d at 407.
19. See id.




Corp.,22 a creative seller brought a DTPA claim against its buyer.
Pennzoil Caspian Corp. ("PCC") contracted with the State Oil Company
of the Azerbaijan Republic to install turbine-driven compressors and re-
lated equipment in the Caspian Sea and to operate and maintain the
equipment after installation. Flameout was the parts supplier for the pro-
ject. PCC purchased over one million dollars' worth of parts from Flame-
out before Flameout wrote to PCC stating that it would not accept any
future orders from PCC. Flameout then sued PCC, asserting claims for
breach of contract, anticipatory repudiation, DTPA violations, fraud, and
negligent misrepresentation. Affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment on the DTPA claim, the Houston Court of Appeals stated:
"Flameout is undoubtedly a consumer as to someone. However, Flame-
out is not a consumer as to PCC. Under the alleged agreement, PCC was
to consume goods supplied by Flameout. Furthermore, the goods pur-
chased are not the basis of Flameout's complaint. '23
B. DOES THE TRANSACTION INVOLVE GOODS OR SERVICES?
An additional statutory issue when determining consumer status is
whether the plaintiff sought or acquired "any goods or services."' 24 Dur-
ing the Survey period, several cases turned on this issue.
Because money is not a good or service, a person who seeks only to
borrow money is not a DTPA consumer.25 When the extension of credit
is incident to the sale of goods or services and the conduct of the creditor
is intertwined in the sale, however, the borrower may be a consumer with
respect to the creditor, as well as with the seller, of the goods or ser-
vices.26 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals examined this concept in
Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas,27 in which disappointed homeowners
sued their builder and mortgagee. The builder introduced the homeown-
ers to the mortgagee, which entered into a "Single Closing Construction
Loan" with the homeowners, under which the mortgagee agreed to in-
spect and check the construction of the home, periodically advance funds
to the builder based upon the inspector's reports of construction progress,
and withhold construction payments until the builder obtained lien waiv-
ers from its subcontractors. The mortgagee did not comply with these
requirements, and when the buyer ceased construction on the home, leav-
ing the homeowners with an unfinished structure subject to significant
liens, the homeowners sued under various theories, including the DTPA,
and obtained a substantial jury verdict. On appeal, the mortgagee con-
22. 994 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
23. Id. at 838 (emphasis in original); see also Essex Ins. Co. v. Blount, Inc., 72 F. Supp.
2d 772 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that an insurance company with assets in excess of $25
million was not itself a consumer and could not assume the consumer status of its insured
when insurer had already paid insured and was suing for its own benefit).
24. DTPA § 17.45(4).
25. See Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174-76 (Tex. 1980).
26. See Brown v. Bank of Galveston, 930 S.W.2d 140,143 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996), affd, 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1998).
27. 999 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
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tended that the homeowners were not DTPA consumers because their
injuries were not sustained in connection with the lending of money.28
The court held that the homeowners were consumers because the mort-
gagee was inextricably intertwined in the home purchase and because the
homeowners' complaint-that the mortgagee failed to properly supervise
funding during the construction of the home-demonstrated an injury in
connection with the mortgage services obtained from the mortgagee. 29
In another case involving real estate, White v. Mellon Mortgage Co.,30
the plaintiff purchased property and assumed obligations under a note
and deed of trust. The deed of trust obligated the borrower to pay annual
premiums for private mortgage insurance. After nearly twenty years,
White became concerned that she had been paying the mortgage insur-
ance premiums unnecessarily. She sued the current holder and servicer
of the note and deed of trust for DTPA violations, both directly and
through the Texas Insurance Code, as well as on various other theories of
recovery. The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that
White was not a consumer. The trial court agreed, and the Tyler Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that "[a]n activity related to a loan transaction
is a 'service' for DTPA purposes only if the activity at issue is, from the
plaintiff's point of view, an objective of the transaction, not merely inci-
dental to it."'31 The court then found that White was not a consumer be-
cause she did not seek the defendants' collection of the mortgage
insurance premiums; in fact, she did not want to pay the premiums at
all.32
Dewitt County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Parks33 involved a rural
easement for a utility right-of-way. Homeowners entered into a contract
with the local electric cooperative for electrical service. In a separate in-
strument, the homeowners granted the cooperative an easement, which
gave the cooperative certain rights with regard to trees located near the
easement. Employees of the cooperative subsequently entered onto the
property and removed two oak trees and substantially trimmed another.
The homeowners sued the cooperative for damages alleging breach of
contract, DTPA violations, and negligence. When the jury reached an
impasse, the trial court directed a verdict for the cooperative, holding that
the cooperative had not breached the easement contract and that the
homeowners' other claims were barred because their action sounded only
in contract. 34
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding
that the easement contract was ambiguous and that two of the homeown-
ers' DTPA claims and their negligence claims were cognizably indepen-
28. See id. at 854.
29. See id. at 855.
30. 995 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Iler 1999, no pet.)
31. Id. at 801 (citing FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 865 (5th Cir. 1986)).
32. See id.
33. 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999).
34. See id. at 99.
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dent of the contract action.35 Both parties filed petitions for review
asking the Texas Supreme Court to reverse and render judgment. The
cooperative argued that the homeowners were not consumers with re-
spect to the easement. 36 Recognizing that "[i]n some cases, an easement
grants only an interest in real property, and no service is provided by the
holder of the easement to the grantor," the court found that the easement
in question was executed in connection with a contract for electrical ser-
vices. 37 Because the homeowners were consumers of the electrical ser-
vice, they were entitled to consumer status.38
C. GOOD FAITH INTENTION TO PURCHASE
In addition to the requirements set forth in the statutory language,
some courts have imposed the requirement that a DTPA consumer be
one who in good faith initiates the purchasing process. 39 To "initiate the
purchasing process" means to: (1) approach the seller as a willing buyer
with the subjective intent of purchasing, and (2) possess "some credible
indicia of the capacity to consummate the transaction. '40
In Holeman v. Landmark Chevrolet Corp.,41 seven would-be "consum-
ers" brought DTPA claims against two automobile dealerships. Both
dealerships had run advertisements stating that all offers would be ac-
cepted. The plaintiffs went to the dealerships and made offers to
purchase vehicles for amounts ranging from $50 to $200, which the deal-
erships rejected. The jury found that the plaintiffs were not consumers,
and on appeal the plaintiffs insisted that the DTPA had no requirement
that the consumers sought to purchase in good faith.42 The plaintiffs of-
fered the example of involuntary consumer status conferred upon persons
whose cars have been towed. The Houston Court of Appeals rejected
this analogy, holding that towees are consumers because they actually ac-
quire the towing services and pay for the towing.43 Applying the good
faith requirement, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment
because the jury could have reasonably found that the plaintiffs were not
acting in good faith-particularly because no one else made such low of-
fers.44 Although not addressed in the opinion, it appears that the case
more properly could have been decided on the ground that the defend-
ants' advertisements were obvious puffery.
35. See id. at 99-100.
36. See id. at 104.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Martin v. Lou Poliquin Enters., 696 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.- Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. Id. at 184-85.
41. 989 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
42. See id. at 398-99.
43. See id. at 398.
44. See id. at 398-401.
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D. WHEN IS IT NOT NECESSARY TO BE A CONSUMER?
Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code affords an independent
cause of action for an "unlawful deceptive trade practice" as defined by
the DTPA.45 Section 16(a) of article 21.21 specifically provides:
Any person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's
engaging in an act or practice declared in Section 4 of this Article to
be ... unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insur-
ance or in any practice specifically enumerated in a subdivision of
Section 17.46(b), Business & Commerce Code, as an unlawful decep-
tive trade practice may maintain an action against the person or per-
sons engaging in such acts or practices.46
While only a "consumer" may maintain an action directly under the
DTPA, the consumer standing requirements of the DTPA were not gen-
erally incorporated into article 21.21, and consumer status is not always
required of an article 21.21 plaintiff.47 When a particular subsection of
the DTPA expressly requires consumer status, however, that requirement
applies to an article 21.21 claim premised on that subsection. 48
In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court considered the question of whether
DTPA section 17.46(b)(23), when incorporated into article 21.21, requires
consumer status.49 Section 17.46(b)(23) affords a cause of action for "the
failure to disclose information concerning goods or services ... intended
to induce the consumer into a transaction. '50 The Texas Supreme Court
held that the reference to a "consumer" and to "goods and services" indi-
cated the necessity for consumer status independent of any other
requirement. 51
The Texas Supreme Court revisited this issue in Crown Life Insurance
Co. v. Casteel,52 a case involving claims by insurance policyholders against
a life insurer and agent and a cross-claim by the agent against the insurer.
The agent sold "Modified Vanishing Premium" life insurance for the in-
surance company. After several years, some of his clients complained
that the premiums had not vanished and, in some cases, would never van-
ish. Two of those clients filed suit against the insurance company and
agent asserting DTPA, article 21.21, and common law causes of action.
The agent then filed a cross-action against the insurer, which included
claims under DTPA provisions incorporated into article 21.21. The agent
alleged that the insurer made misrepresentations in its policy illustrations
provided to the agent and presented to his clients. The jury found for the
insureds on their claims against the agent and insurer and for the agent
45. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1999).
46. Id. § 16(a).
47. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1987).
48. See Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 273-74 (Tex. 1995).
49. See id. at 274.
50. DTPA § 17.46(b)(23).
51. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d at 273.
52. 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 348, 2000 WL 72142 (Tex. Jan. 27, 2000) (not designated for
publication).
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on his cross-action against the insurer. The trial court granted the in-
surer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the agent's
cross-action, in part because the agent was not a DTPA "consumer," and
the court of appeals affirmed.53
Reversing, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding that article
21.21 does not generally incorporate the DTPA's consumer standing re-
quirement but that a specific enumerated deceptive act nevertheless may
require consumer status. 54 The court then applied its reasoning in Fair-
cloth to all DTPA claims brought under Article 21.21, holding that con-
sumer status is required "to state a cause of action under Article 21.21 for
the violation of a DTPA subsection if the subsection either (1) specifically
involves a consumer transaction, or (2) involves the misrepresentation of
'goods or services' acquired by the plaintiff."' 55
Turning to the agent's particular claims, the court held that DTPA sec-
tions 17.46(b)(5),56 17.46(b)(7),57 17.46(b)(9), 58 and 17.46(b)(23) require
consumer status because they deal with misrepresentations of "goods or
services."'59 The court held that the agent was not a consumer for pur-
poses of these claims because the claims arose from the policy illustration
information he transmitted from the insurer to his clients and not from
misrepresentations about goods or services the agent sought to acquire
for himself.60 Because the agent was not a consumer, his claims pursuant
to sections 17.46(b)(5), 17.46(b)(7), 17.46(b)(9), and 17.46(b)(23) were
barred.
The court reached a different conclusion with respect to the agent's
claim under section 17.46(b)(12), which prohibits "representing that an
agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it
does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law."'6' Because this
language neither explicitly arises out of a consumer transaction nor in-
volves misrepresentations of goods or services, the court held that con-
sumer status was not required. 62
53. The agent admitted that he did have consumer status, but argued that such status
was not required. See id. at *6.
54. See id. at *6.
55. Id.
56. Section 17.46(b)(5) prohibits "representing that goods or services have sponsor-
ship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not
have." DTPA § 17.46(b)(5).
57. Section 17.46(b)(7) prohibits "representing that goods or services are of a particu-
lar standard, quality, or grade ... if they are of another." Id. § 17.46(b)(7).
58. Section 17.46(b)(9) prohibits "advertising goods or services with intent not to sell
them as advertised." Id. § 17.46(b)(9).
59. Crown Life, 2000 WL 72142 at *7.
60. See id. at *7.
61. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12).
62. See Crown Life, 2000 WL 74142 at *7; see also Tweedell v. Hochheim Prairie Farm
Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 1 S.W.3d 304, 308 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (applying
Crown Life and holding that in article 21.21 cases, claims under subsections 2 and 4 of
DTPA section 17.46(b) require consumer status because they relate to misrepresentations
concerning acquired goods and services, but claims under subsections 3 and 8 do not re-




In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff also must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such act was
the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 63
A. LAUNDRY LIST CLAIMS
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in twenty-four subparts, a nonexclu-
sive list of actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
under the statute. Plaintiffs invoking these "laundry list '"64 claims are not
required to prove or plead the defendant's state of mind or intent to
deceive.65 Nor have plaintiffs been required to show that they relied on
the enumerated deceptions. 66 Whether a consumer should have to show
reliance, however, remains the subject of debate. 67 Several significant
cases involving "laundry list" claims were decided during the survey
period.
1. § 17.46(b) (12)-Misrepresentation of Rights, Remedies,
or Obligations
To maintain an action for misrepresentation under DTPA section
17.46(b)(12), a consumer must show that the defendant represented "that
an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it
does not have or involve."'68 This provision has been frequently invoked
by plaintiffs seeking to convert a breach of contract into a DTPA
violation. 69
Dewitt County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Parks70 clarified the interac-
tion between this section of the DTPA and the parties' rights under a
contract. The plaintiff homeowners claimed that: (1) an easement agree-
ment between themselves and a utility cooperative was itself a misrepre-
sentation that their trees would not be cut, and (2) the cooperative's
interpretation of the easement constituted an actionable representation
that the easement gave the cooperative the right to cut down the trees,
63. DTPA § 17.50(a)(1)-(3).
64. The earliest located reported case that referred to the enumerated items listed
under DTPA section 17.46(b) as a "laundry list" occurred in Mobile County Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Jewell, 555 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. See Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Tex. 1980).
66. See Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985).
67. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assoc., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.
1995).
68. DTPA § 17.46(b)(12).
69. See, e.g., Adler Paper Stock, Inc. v. Houston Refuse Disposal, Inc., 930 S.W.2d 761,
764-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Hometown Real Estate Co., 890 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ de-
nied); Garrison Contractors, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 927 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1996), aff d, 966 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1998).
70. 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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when in fact the easement conferred no such right.71 The Texas Supreme
Court examined the easement contract and found that it unambiguously
authorized the cooperative to remove trees from the right-of-way and
trim trees growing within the right-of-way. The court then held that its
interpretation of the contract barred the homeowners' section
17.46(b)(12) claims because DTPA claims may not arise from actions that
are permissible under a contract between the parties. 72
2. § 17.46(b)(23)-Failure to Disclose
Section 17.46(b)(23) is perhaps the broadest "laundry list" provision, as
it permits a consumer to premise a DTPA claim on the allegation that the
defendant failed to disclose information to the consumer prior to con-
summation of the transaction. To maintain an action for failure to dis-
close under this section, a consumer must show that the defendant failed
to disclose information concerning goods or services, which was known at
the time of the transaction, and that the nondisclosure was motivated by
the intent to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer otherwise would not have entered.73
The Texas Supreme Court also discussed this provision in Dewitt
County Electric Cooperative.74 The homeowners argued, and the cooper-
ative conceded, that the cooperative had failed to disclose its policy of
clearing all trees and shrubs from a utility right-of-way. The court held
that this failure to disclose was not actionable under section 17.46(b)(23)
because "it is not a DTPA violation if one party to an agreement fails to
inform the other party that it intends to exercise rights that the agree-
ment expressly confers."'75
The dangers of an uncritical application of DTPA section 17.46(23) are
illustrated by Nwaigwe v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance
Co.76 In that case, the owner of a rent house approached an insurer in-
quiring about fire coverage. According to the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals, the owner indicated to the agent that the house would not be
vacant for more than thirty consecutive days a year. 77 The owner signed
an insurance application acknowledging that the coverage was subject to
the policy terms, but the owner evidently never obtained a copy of the
policy. The policy was issued and, contrary to the owner's representa-
tions to the agent, the house was unoccupied for more than sixty days
prior to a fire, which destroyed the premises. The insurer denied cover-
age based upon a clause in the policy that excluded coverage for a build-
71. See id. at 103.
72. See id.
73. See DTPA § 17.46(b)(23); see also Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907
S.W.2d 472, 479 (Tex. 1995).
74. 1 S.W.3d 96 (Tex. 1999); see supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 103-04.
76. No. 04-98-00037-CV, 1999 WL 343774 (Tex. App.-San Antonio May 28, 1999, no
pet.).
77. See id. at *2.
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ing vacant for sixty days preceding the loss. The owner sued the insurer
and agent under various theories, including a DTPA claim based upon
the defendants' alleged failure to disclose the vacancy clause.78
The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the DTPA claim.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the summary judgment evi-
dence failed to negate as a matter of law a nondisclosure claim under
DTPA section 17.46(b)(23). 79 In support of this conclusion, the court
opined that, in order to prove that they disclosed the vacancy clause, "the
defendants were required to show they had discussed it with [the plain-
tiff] or had provided it to him in writing."80
The court of appeals opinion appears flawed on several levels. First
and most importantly, it fails to explain how the defendants could have
intended to induce the plaintiff to purchase the policy by omitting disclo-
sure of the vacancy clause when, as the opinion acknowledges, the owner
affirmatively represented to the agent that the house would not be vacant
for more than thirty days. Indeed, based upon the facts recited by the
court of appeals, it would seem impossible for the defendants to have
intended to induce the owner into purchasing the policy by failing to dis-
close the sixty day vacancy clause when the plaintiff had advised the de-
fendants that the house would not be vacant for even half that time.8'
Second, and relatedly, based upon the insured's representation to the
agent, it is difficult to see how the vacancy clause could have been mate-
rial, since the plaintiff's own allegations negate the proposition that the
plaintiff would not have entered into the transaction had the vacancy
clause been disclosed.
More profoundly troubling, however, are the logical consequences of
the court of appeals' analysis. Under the statute's express terms, if a
seller in possession of material information fails to disclose that informa-
tion for the purpose of inducing a consumer transaction, DTPA section
17.46(b)(23) is available to an aggrieved consumer who, but for the omis-
sion, would not have entered into the transaction. 82 In Nwaigwe, how-
ever, there was no suggestion of a "failure to disclose" in any but the
most literal sense, and no suggestion whatsoever of an intent to induce
the plaintiff through such nondisclosure. Indeed, there is a studied ambi-
guity in the court of appeals' discussion as to why the insured did not
receive a copy of the policy-indeed, as to whether the insured ever
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. (citing, inter alia, Parkins v. Texas Farmers Ins. Co., 645 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.
1983)).
81. In consecutive sentences the court's opinion states that the plaintiff informed the
agent that the house "would not be vacant for more than thirty consecutive days per year,"
and then goes on to assert that the "parties did not discuss whether the house would be
vacant for a longer term or whether the policy would cover a vacant house." Id. at *2.
82. See DTPA § 17.46(b)(23); see also Liptak v. Pensabene, 736 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex.
App.-Iyler 1987, no writ) (permitting recovery under DTPA § 17.45(23) when defendants
failed to disclose termite infestation in order to induce the plaintiffs to purchase property,
which plaintiffs would not have purchased had they been aware of termite problems).
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asked for a copy or questioned why he did not receive one. Given the
manifest lack of materiality of the vacancy clause at the time the policy
was issued, the court of appeals opinion stands for the breathtaking pro-
position that a contracting consumer who fails for whatever reason to
obtain a copy of the parties' contract may later assert a DTPA claim
based upon the "nondisclosure" of contract terms that operate against his
interests.
3. Section 17.50-Breach of Express or Implied Warranties
Although a DTPA claim may be based upon the breach of an express
or implied warranty, the DTPA does not itself create any warranties. 83
To be actionable under the DTPA, an implied warranty must be recog-
nized by the common law or created by statute.84
The Texas Supreme Court examined this type of DTPA claim in Rocky
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hospital District.85 In that
case, a hospital sued a helicopter maintenance company for negligence
and DTPA violations stemming from a fuel spill and the subsequent
cleanup. The jury found that the maintenance company had engaged in a
false, misleading or deceptive act or practice. On appeal, the mainte-
nance company argued that the requirements for the extension of an im-
plied warranty of good and workmanlike performance of services (upon
which the DTPA violation presumably was premised) were not present.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed, noting that it had recognized an im-
plied warranty for services only when the services related to the repair or
modification of existing goods.86 The court also noted that an implied
warranty that services would be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner arises only when there is a compelling need, and that compelling
need is not present when the consumer has other adequate remedies. 87
Here, the hospital had adequate remedies (in fact, the hospital also had
raised a negligence claim). 88 The court therefore held that "Texas law
does not recognize an implied warranty that services incidental to heli-
copter maintenance will be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner."89
B. INCORPORATION OF THE DTPA INTO THE
TEXAS INSURANCE CODE
Numerous statutes incorporate various sections of the DTPA or permit
83. See Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. 1995); DTPA
§ 17.50(a)(2).
84. See Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 438 (citing La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984)).
85. 987 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1998).
86. See id. at 52-53.





recovery for their violation via the DTPA.90 One of the most frequently
invoked of these "borrowing" statutes is article 21.21 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code. 9' During the survey period, several plaintiffs invoked article
21.21 to allege deceptive acts by insurers in connection with insurance
claims.
The Texas Supreme Court examined an insured's attempt to character-
ize an insurer's pre-approval of surgery as an actionable misrepresenta-
tion in Provident American Insurance Co. v. Castaneda.92 Castaneda's
father purchased a health insurance policy covering his family. The policy
excluded coverage for a sickness that manifests within thirty days of the
effective date of the policy and for diseases of certain internal organs,
including the gallbladder, unless the loss occurred more than six months
after the effective date.93 Three days after the thirty-day period expired,
Castaneda was diagnosed with a hereditary condition that is customarily
treated by removal of the gallbladder. The insurer pre-approved the sur-
gery and the gallbladder was removed, but the insurer later denied the
insured's claims based upon a policy exclusion involving the timing of the
illness's manifestation. 94 The insured then sued, alleging violations of the
DTPA and article 21.21 of the Insurance Code.
The court held that the insurer's pre-approval was not an actionable
representation under either the Insurance Code or the DTPA because at
the time the insurer authorized the surgery, it had not been given mate-
rial facts regarding the pre-existing nature of the insured's condition. 95
The court also held that there was no evidence that the insured relied
upon the pre-approval to her detriment, particularly as removal of the
gallbladder was the only known cure for her condition. 96
Lane v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 97 involved a
mother's insurance claim arising from the death of her child. The plaintiff
and the child's father were estranged and the child had been living with
his grandparents when he died in an automobile accident. State Farm
issued the grandparents a check under their automobile insurance policy.
90. Statutes either incorporating provisions of the DTPA or permitting recovery for
their violation via the DTPA include: TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.007, 59.005, 221.024,
221.071, 222.011 (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2000); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.74(c)
(Vernon 1987); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 164.013 (Vernon 1992 & Supp.
2000); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4413(36)(E), 4552-5.09, 4552-5.11, 4552-5.18, 5221a-7, 5221a-8, 5221f, 55211, 9020
(Vernon 1962, 1976 & Supp. 2000); and TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 684.086 (Vernon 1999
& Supp. 2000).
91. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2000).
92. 988 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1999).
93. See id. at 191.
94. See id. at 191-92.
95. See id. at 199-200.
96. See id. at 200; see also Frazer v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 4 S.W.3d 819,
823 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that although insurance agent's
alleged failure to honor promise to increase insured's coverage limits might constitute neg-
ligence or a breach of contract, it was not a "false, misleading or deceptive act" within the
meaning of the DTPA).
97. 992 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
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In addition, because underinsured motorist coverage benefits were avail-
able to the child's parents, State Farm located the child's father and of-
fered to settle by paying half of the policy limits to the father and half to
the plaintiff. The child's father accepted the offer and State Farm issued
checks accordingly. The mother sued State Farm under article 21.21 al-
leging that State Farm "fraudulently relied on false information and rep-
resentations" in settling her claim.98
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the article 21.21 claim,
arguing that article 21.21 requires the same predicate for recovery as a
bad faith claim and that because it was not guilty of bad faith, it was
entitled to judgment on the article 21.21 claim as well. 99 The trial court
granted the motion but the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed. Al-
though acknowledging that a defense to a bad faith claim also is a defense
to extracontractual claims that merely recharacterize the bad faith claim,
the court found that the tortious acts alleged here differed from the plain-
tiff's bad faith claim and thus were not barred by a finding of no bad
faith. 00
In contrast, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas in Douglas v. State Farm Lloyds'0 1 broadly opined that "in order
to establish a statutory violation under the Insurance Code or the DTPA,
the elements necessary to demonstrate an insurer's breach of the com-
mon law duty of good faith and fair dealing must be proven." 10 2 In that
case, homeowners brought claims against their insurer for breach of con-
tract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violations of
the Insurance Code and DTPA. Finding that the homeowners failed to
carry their summary judgment burden on their bad faith claims, the court
concluded that summary judgment was appropriate on their DTPA and
Insurance Code claims as well.103 The court's rationale, however, was
narrower than the literal scope of its ruling. As the court explained,
"when an insured joins claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the
DTPA with a bad faith claim, all asserting a wrongful denial of policy
benefits, if there is no merit to the bad faith claim, there can be no liabil-
ity on either of the statutory claims."'01 4 Accordingly, although the court
used quite broad language, it was faced only with DTPA and Insurance
Code claims stemming from the insurer's denial of an insurance claim.
Such a situation seemingly is distinguishable from that in Lane, where the
plaintiff raised DTPA and Insurance Code claims arising from actions
separate from the insurer's denial of her claim.105
98. Id. at 553. The meaning of this rather odd allegation is not explained in the
opinion.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 553-54.
101. 37 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
102. Id. at 544.
103. See id. at 544-45.
104. Id. at 544 (citing Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456,
459 (5th Cir. 1997)).




During the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court revisited the vex-
ing issue of the applicability of the DTPA to professional services in
Douglas v. Delp.10 6 The plaintiff sued her attorneys for legal malpractice
arising from their representation of her in a prior business dispute. She
also alleged that by encouraging her to enter into a settlement agreement
on her underlying claims, the attorneys violated the DTPA. The trial
court granted a directed verdict on all claims and the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded. Reversing the court of appeals' deci-
sion, the Texas Supreme Court declared that "statements of opinion
alone are generally insufficient to rise to the level of actionable misrepre-
sentations under the DTPA.' 10 7 At trial, the plaintiff had not identified
any particular misrepresentations, but testified only that the attorneys ad-
vised her to sign the settlement agreement. The court assumed that a
misrepresentation could be inferred from that advice, but held that such a
representation constituted, at most, nonactionable opinion because it was
so vague that the jury would have no standard by which to measure its
accuracy. 10 8 This approach seems at odds with the 1995 amendment to
DTPA section 17.49(c), limiting the DTPA's applicability in the profes-
sional context to misrepresentations that "cannot be characterized as
advice."109
D. UNCONSCIONABILITY
DTPA section 17.45(5) defines an "unconscionable action or course of
action" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
consumer to a grossly unfair degree.""l 0 The plaintiff in Ballestros v.
Jones"' alleged that her attorney acted unconscionably, as well as com-
mitted legal malpractice, during his representation of her during an action
for common law marriage and divorce. The plaintiff based her claims on
the contention that the attorney obtained an inadequate settlement and
charged her an excessive fee. The jury agreed, finding that the attorney
was negligent and had acted unconscionably. The trial court entered a
106. 987 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1999). It appears from the court's opinion that the case was
decided under the pre-1995 version of the DTPA. See id. at 881 (noting that suit was filed
in 1991).
107. Id. at 886.
108. See id.; see also Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that insurance agent's alleged representation that insurer would handle claims
"professionally" and that agent would monitor the progress of insured's claim were non-
actionable puffery rather than actionable representations of specific material fact); In re R
& C Petroleum, Inc., 236 B.R. 355, 361 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that the DTPA's
exclusion for professional services does not apply to an "express misrepresentation of a
material fact that cannot be characterized as advice, judgment or opinion").
109. DTPA § 17.49(c)(1).
110. DTPA § 17.45(5). Prior to the 1995 amendments, the definition also included an
act or practice that "results in a gross disparity between the value received and considera-
tion paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration." DTPA § 17.45(5).
111. 985 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (en banc).
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judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the DTPA claim on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence of unconscionable acts.
Sitting en banc, the San Antonio Court of Appeals agreed. Applying
the pre-1995 amendment version of the DTPA, the court held that the
parties' contingency fee contract was both valid and enforceable and thus
not unconscionable.1 12 The court found that the remaining conduct com-
plained of was, at most, negligence that could give rise to a legal malprac-
tice claim but did not rise to the higher level of culpability required for a
violation of the DTPA.1 13
IV. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages. 114 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted "knowingly,"
the plaintiff also may recover damages for mental anguish and additional
statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic damages.
1 15
A. REQUIREMENT OF "KNOWING CONDUCT"
The court in Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Elder1 16 examined the suffi-
ciency of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was done knowingly.
The plaintiff purchased a boat from Bayliner. He had problems with the
boat and Bayliner replaced it with a second boat. The second boat also
had problems and the plaintiff sued Bayliner under the DTPA. At trial,
the jury instruction stated that "'Knowingly' means actual awareness of
the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the conduct in question or actual
awareness of the conduct constituting a failure to comply with a warranty.
Actual awareness may be inferred where objective manifestations indi-
cate that a person acted with actual awareness."'1
17
The jury found that Bayliner had acted knowingly and awarded the
plaintiff $30,000 in extra statutory damages. On appeal, Bayliner argued
that the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to support the
jury's finding of knowing behavior. Plaintiff's counsel had elicited testi-
mony from Bayliner's senior service manager and from a mechanic em-
ployed by the boat dealer from whom the plaintiff had purchased the
boat. Bayliner's employee testified that Bayliner had installed larger en-
gines in the plaintiff's type of boat without conducting any testing. The
mechanic testified that he believed the boat had a design flaw. Based
upon this testimony, the court of appeals held that the evidence was both
legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that Bayliner
acted knowingly. 118
112. See id. at 497.
113. See id. at 497-98.
114. See DTPA § 17.50(b)(1).
115. Id.
116. 994 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 443.
118. See id. at 444.
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B. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
The Texas Supreme Court examined the evidence required to recover
mental anguish damages under the DTPA in Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v.
O'Byrne.119 The plaintiff purchased an automobile from the defendant
dealership, which repeatedly assured him that the automobile was new
and had never been damaged. When the plaintiff discovered that the au-
tomobile had, in fact, been damaged, repaired and repainted, he sued
alleging fraud and violations of the DTPA. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff, which included $10,000 in mental anguish damages. On
appeal, the dealership contended that the evidence was legally insuffi-
cient to support an award of mental anguish damages. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Reversing, the Texas Supreme Court recited its rule that plaintiffs seek-
ing mental anguish damages must introduce "direct evidence of the na-
ture, duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a
substantial disruption in the plaintiffs' daily routine. '120 Applying this
test, the court held that the plaintiff's testimony that he was ridiculed by
his friends and felt "a constant mental sensation of pain or a rude awak-
ening" from not getting the car he expected and anguish over the car's
unreliability was legally insufficient to support an award of mental
anguish damages.' 2' The court emphasized that, "[s]imply because a
plaintiff says he or she suffered mental anguish does not constitute evi-
dence of the nature, duration, and severity of any mental anguish that is
sufficient to show a substantial disruption of one's daily routine."'1 22
V. DTPA DEFENSES AND EXEMPTIONS
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent. 23 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct. 24 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are not available to combat DTPA claims.125 Other courts
have recognized a variety of defenses to DTPA claims.' 26 Additionally,
119. 996 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1999).
120. Id. at 860.
121. Id. at 860-61.
122. Id. at 861. The court also noted that mental anguish arising from the car's unrelia-
bility was not causally connected to the dealership's misrepresentations. Id.
123. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture,
798 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
124. See, e.g., DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(9), (10), (13), (16), (23).
125. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex.
1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA was to relieve consumers of com-
mon law defenses while providing a cause of action for misrepresentation).
126. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Mach., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may
be barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV, 1995
WL 500308, at *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 23, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for
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both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
A. "MERE" BREACH OF CONTRACT NOT ACTIONABLE
UNDER THE DTPA
In addition to its claim of an implied warranty, the plaintiff in Rocky
Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hospital District127 argued
that the defendant misrepresented the characteristics of the helicopter
maintenance services it agreed to perform under the parties' contract.
128
In that contract, the defendant agreed to indemnify the hospital for losses
arising from the defendant's willful or negligent acts. Rejecting this claim
as a matter of law, the Texas Supreme Court held that the defendant's
failure to indemnify the hospital was at most a breach of contract and was
not actionable under the DTPA.1
29
B. PREEMPTION AND EXEMPTION FROM THE DTPA
Certain statutory schemes and common law doctrines bar DTPA claims
either expressly or by implication. During the survey period, several
cases examined these limitations on the DTPA's reach.
130
1. Smoke Detector Act
The Texas Smoke Detector Act provides for liability if a landlord fails
to install a smoke detector at the time of a tenant's initial occupancy of a
dwelling. 131 The plaintiffs in Pruit v. Orr132 sued under various theories
including the DTPA for injuries their children received from a fire in a
rental home the plaintiffs were visiting. Affirming the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the defendant, the court of appeals followed a
decision of the San Antonio Court of Appeals133 and held that under the
facts of the case, the Texas Smoke Detector Act preempts claims for
breach of the warranty of habitability. 134
publication) (applying illegality/public policy affirmative defense to DTPA claims); Keri-
otis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (applying statute of frauds to DTPA claims).
127. 987 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1998); see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
128. See Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 987 S.W.2d at 53.
129. See id.
130. See also Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing DTPA claims barred by section 82.004 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code);
Duzich v. Marine Office of Am. Corp., 980 S.W.2d 857, 872 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi
1998, pet. denied) (holding DTPA claims not preempted by Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 31321 et seq.).
131. See TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. §§ 92.251 et seq. (Vernon 1995 & Supp. 2000).
132. 991 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
133. See Garza-Vale v. Kwiecien, 796 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990,
writ denied).




a. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act ("MLIIA") was
enacted in response to "a medical malpractice insurance crisis."'1 35 Re-
garding DTPA claims, section 12.01(a) of the MLLIA provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provisions of Section 17.41-17.63,
Business & Commerce Code [the DTPA], shall apply to physicians
or health care providers as defined in Section 1.03(3) of this Act,
with respect to claims for damages for personal injury or death re-
sulting, or alleged to have resulted, from negligence on the part of
any physician or health care provider.136
If a plaintiff's DTPA claim is not based upon a breach of the accepted
standard of medical care, however, the claim is not barred by the
MLIIA. 37 The Texas Supreme Court applied these principles in Mac-
Gregor Medical Association v. Campbell. 38 The plaintiff ingested a con-
taminated beverage and was taken to the defendant's medical center.
The medical center staff examined the plaintiff, assured him that he
would be fine, and advised him to take Maalox. The plaintiff continued
to experience severe stomach problems and sued the medical center al-
leging negligence, DTPA violations, breach of contract and breach of
warranty.' 39 Regarding the DTPA claims, the plaintiff alleged that the
medical center's employees delayed examining the plaintiff for almost an
hour after he arrived at the medical center. 140 The plaintiff also alleged
that the medical center falsely represented that it would provide "the best
health services possible" and "qualified personnel and resources" and
that the plaintiff was fine and needed only Maalox, and failed to advise
the plaintiff of possible complications from his injury.' 41 The Texas Su-
preme Court held that the essence of these claims was that the medical
center failed to provide quality medical care.142 Because successful proof
of this claim would require proof of the applicable standard of care, the
court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the MLIIA. 143
The Texas Supreme Court also applied this doctrine during the report-
ing period in Earle v. Ratliff,144 in which a patient sued the surgeon who
had performed his two back surgeries. The plaintiff alleged that the sur-
geon violated the DTPA by telling him that: (1) he needed surgery; (2) he
would get "95% better" and would be able to return to work; (3) the
devices the surgeon would implant in the plaintiff were safe, approved for
135. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.02(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
136. Id. § 12.01(a).
137. See Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex. 1994).
138. 985 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1998).
139. The plaintiff died during the proceedings, so his wife continued in her individual
capacity and as representative of her husband's estate. See id. at 39.
140. See id. at 40.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 41.
143. See id.
144. 998 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. 1999).
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such use, and would remain in place permanently; and (4) the plaintiff's
pain was to be expected but would get better. The court held that these
representations all related to the surgeon's treatment of the plaintiff and
could be summarized as claims that the surgeon did not meet the applica-
ble standard of care. 145 Because such a claim sounds in negligence, the
court held that summary judgment was proper on the plaintiff's DTPA
claims. 146
In Wright v. Fowler,147 the plaintiff sued his cosmetic surgeon, the sur-
geon's professional association and others for injuries related to silicone
cheek implants. The suit was brought under theories of strict liability,
breach of warranty and negligence. After the defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment on all causes of action, the plaintiff filed an
amended petition, newly claiming that the actions described in his origi-
nal petition also constituted medical malpractice and misrepresentations
in violation of the DTPA.148 Affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the MLIIA barred
the plaintiff's claims.149 Although generally, the relevant sections of the
DTPA do not require proof of intent or knowledge, the court held that
because the MLIIA bars DTPA claims based on negligence, a plaintiff
who asserts a misrepresentation claim against a health care provider must
plead that the defendant's misrepresentation was made intentionally or
knowingly. 150 The plaintiff's failure to plead knowing or intentional con-
duct or seek treble damages indicated that his claim actually was
grounded in negligence and that he had improperly attempted to recast
his health care liability claim as a DTPA claim to avoid the MLIIA's strict
two-year limitations period.151
b. Application of the "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
The "learned intermediary doctrine" is one peculiar to cases involving
a medical product manufacturer's duty to warn.152 Under Texas' inter-
pretation of this doctrine, "when a drug manufacturer properly warns a
prescribing physician of the dangerous propensities of its product, the
manufacturer is excused from warning each patient who receives the
drug. The doctor stands as a learned intermediary between the manufac-
turer and the ultimate consumer. ' 153 The physician's knowledge of the
145. See id. at 893.
146. See id.
147. 991 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1999, no pet.)
148. The plaintiff alleged violations of DTPA sections 17.46(b)(5) and 17.46 (b)(7). See
id. at 353 n.14.
149. See id. at 352-53.
150. See id. at 353.
151. See id.; see also Nguyen v. Kim, 3 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, no pet.) (holding that plaintiff's DTPA claims that physician failed to perform appro-
priate procedure and failed to obtain informed consent were barred by the MLIIA).
152. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir.
1999).
153. Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 591-92 (Tex. 1986).
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warning operates to protect the manufacturer and serves to shift the duty
of explaining risks to the physician unless the warning provided to the
physician is inadequate or misleading.15 4 If a warning was given but was
defective, the plaintiff may recover by proving that the failure to warn
was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injury.155
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied this
doctrine in two DTPA cases during the reporting period. In the first case,
In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 56 five women
who had suffered side effects from their use of the contraceptive Nor-
plant sued the parent company of the manufacturer. The defendant ob-
tained summary judgment based on the learned intermediary doctrine. 157
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the doctrine was inapplicable to
DTPA claims because many Texas cases decline to apply common law
defenses and doctrines that affect the burden of proof in DTPA cases. 158
Rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that some common law
doctrines are applicable to the DTPA and that in three cases, Texas courts
of appeals had specifically applied the learned intermediary doctrine to
the DTPA.' 59
We therefore make an Erie guess that the Texas Supreme Court
would hold that the learned intermediary doctrine is not a common
law defense but instead a common law doctrine ... that establishes
the degree to which a prescription drug manufacturer is liable for an
end user's reliance on the effects of a prescription drug. Because we
hold that the learned intermediary doctrine is not a common law de-
fense ... [the plaintiffs'] argument that the district court incorrectly
applied it to the DTPA fails.' 60
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' invitation to follow the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's holding that there is an exception to the learned inter-
mediary doctrine in cases where the federal Food and Drug Administra-
tion has provided recommended warnings.' 6' The court found the
Oklahoma court's reasoning to be "puzzling" and recognized that "the
FDA has explicitly stated that its regulation should not affect civil tort
liability for drug manufacturers. 1162 The court also noted that there was
no FDA mandated labeling for Norplant.' 63
The Fifth Circuit examined the learned intermediary doctrine again in
Porterfield v. Ethicon, Inc.'64 In that case, a patient whose injuries alleg-
154. See id. at 592.
155. See Stewart v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, writ denied).
156. 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999).
157. See id. at 376.
158. See id. at 377.
159. See id. at 378.
160. Id.
161. See id. at 379 (discussing Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla.
1997)).
162. In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 379.
163. See id. at 379-80.
164. 183 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1999).
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edly resulted from polypropylene mesh surgically implanted in her abdo-
men to repair a hernia sued the mesh manufacturer. Invoking the
learned intermediary doctrine, the manufacturer moved for summary
judgment on the patient's DTPA implied warranty of merchantability
claim. Although there was evidence that the warning given was defective,
the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the
failure to warn was a "producing cause" of her injury, as required under
the doctrine. 165 The plaintiff's surgeon testified that he had not read the
defective warning, but instead relied upon surgical literature and upon his
and his colleagues' experience in determining that the benefits of using
the mesh outweighed the risks. Because the surgeon "was aware of the
possible risks of using the mesh but decided to use it anyway," the court
held that the inadequate warning was not a producing cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. 166
C. SETTLEMENT OFFERS AND MITIGATION
The DTPA permits a defendant to limit its damages by making a rea-
sonable settlement offer. 167 The settlement offer must include an offer to
pay both damages for the plaintiff's claim and an amount of money to
compensate the plaintiff for the plaintiff's reasonable and necessary attor-
neys' fees incurred prior to the date of the offer. 168 If the plaintiff rejects
the offer, and after trial the court finds that the amount offered for dam-
ages is the same as, substantially the same as, or more than the damages
found by the trier of fact, the plaintiff may recover only the lesser of the
amount tendered in the settlement offer or the amount of damages found
by the trier of fact. 169 The court must then determine the amount of rea-
sonable and necessary attorneys' fees required to compensate the plain-
tiff for fees incurred before the rejected settlement offer was made. If the
court finds that the amount offered to compensate the plaintiff for attor-
neys' fees is the same as, substantially the same as, or more than the
amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees incurred by the plain-
tiff as of the date of the offer, the plaintiff's recovery is limited to recov-
ery of the amount of fees tendered in the offer. 170
The Texas Supreme Court clarified the interaction between the DTPA,
settlement offers and a plaintiff's common law duty to mitigate damages
in Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v. O'Byrne.171 In that case, the plaintiff sought an
automobile with particular specifications. He purchased an automobile
from the defendant dealership, which repeatedly but falsely assured him
that the automobile was new and had never been damaged. When the
plaintiff discovered that the automobile had, in fact, been damaged, re-
165. Id. at 467-68.
166. Id. at 468.
167. See DTPA § 17.5052 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
168. See id. § 17.5052(d).
169. See id. § 17.5052(g).
170. See id. § 17.052(h).
171. 996 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1999). See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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paired, and repainted, the dealer offered to replace the vehicle but was
unable to produce an exact duplicate. The dealer then made several addi-
tional settlement offers, all of which the plaintiff rejected. When the
plaintiff brought suit, the dealership claimed that the plaintiff had
breached his duty to mitigate damages by refusing to accept the dealer-
ship's settlement offers. The trial court declined to instruct the jury on
mitigation of damages, and the San Antonio Court of Appeals
affirmed. 172
Before the Texas Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the settle-
ment offer provisions of the DTPA foreclosed the application of common
law mitigation of damages principles. The court rejected this argument,
holding that a plaintiff in a DTPA case has a duty to mitigate damages
because "[n]othing in the DTPA evidences a legislative intent to with-
draw mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense, even when a defen-
dant alleges that the consumer failed to mitigate by failing to accept the
defendant's offer to mitigate. Nor does the concept of mitigation inher-
ently conflict with the DTPA."' 73 Applying the rule of mitigation of
damages to the facts of the case, however, the court rejected the dealer-
ship's contention that it was entitled to a jury instruction on mitigation.
The court held that a defendant is entitled to such an instruction based on
its own offer to the plaintiff only when the offer was unconditional and
thus a true offer to mitigate rather than an offer to settle.174 Because the
dealership's offers required that O'Byrne release his claims, the offers
were not true offers to mitigate and the dealership was not entitled to a
jury instruction on mitigation.' 75
D. CAUSATION
Liability under the DTPA is limited to actions that are a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages.176 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, a showing of producing cause does not require that the injury be
foreseeable. t77 "Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, ex-
citing, or contributing cause, which in a natural sequence, produced inju-
ries or damages complained of."' 178 When determining whether the
actions complained of are the producing cause of a plaintiff's damages,
courts look to whether the alleged conduct is a substantial factor that
brings about the plaintiff's injury, without which the injury would not
have occurred.' 79
172. See Gunn Infiniti, 996 S.W.2d at 856.
173. Id. at 856-57.
174. See id. at 859-60.
175. See id.
176. See Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
177. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
178. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).




While the DTPA's "producing cause" element does not require that the
plaintiff's damages be foreseeable, the defendant's actions or omissions
nevertheless must be a "cause in fact" of the plaintiff's injury,180 "a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about injury which would not otherwise have
occurred.' 181 In Roberts v. Healey, 82 this test was held to preclude a
plaintiff's DTPA claims in a case arising out of domestic violence. The
woman had engaged the defendant attorney to represent her in her di-
vorce. The woman told the attorney about her estranged husband's drug
use and that he had threatened her. The attorney prepared and filed an
application for a restraining order but, despite numerous requests, never
made an effort to obtain the court's entry of a signed protective order.
Eventually, the estranged husband broke into the woman's apartment,
killed their two children and shot and wounded his mother-in-law. The
woman and her mother then sued the attorney, alleging that his failure to
obtain a protective order constituted negligence, breach of contract and
violations of the DTPA. The attorney obtained summary judgment on
the plaintiffs' negligence and DTPA claims because the attorney's actions
were not the "cause in fact" of the plaintiffs' injuries.183 The court held
that, "[a]t some point in the causal chain, the defendant's conduct may be
too remotely connected with the plaintiff's injury to constitute legal cau-
sation.' 84 If a defendant's conduct does nothing more than "furnish the
condition that makes the plaintiff's injury possible," legal causation is ab-
sent. 185 Applying this theory to the facts of the case, and viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court held that, at
most, the failure to get a protective order created a condition that made
the murder possible and was thus not the legal cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries.' 86
In Higbie Roth Construction Co. v. Houston Shell & Concrete,187 the
Houston Court of Appeals recognized that there are limits to the concept
of "producing cause" under the DTPA. A construction company sued a
cement company and its subcontractor, claiming that the subcontractor's
negligence resulted in injury to the construction company's employee,
which in turn resulted in higher workers' compensation premiums. Af-
firming the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the DTPA claim,
the court noted that "producing cause" requires that the defendant's ac-
180. See Roberts v. Healey, 991 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Tex. App.-Houston 1999, pet.
denied).
181. Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 161.
182. See Roberts, 991 S.W.2d at 873.
183. See id. at 878-80.
184. Id. at 879 (citing Union Pump Co., 898 S.W.2d at 775).
185. Id.
186. See id.; see also Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hosp. Dist.,
987 S.W.2d 50, 53-54 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting a DTPA claim based upon the defendant's
failure to abide by its written policy for training employees because, while there was some
evidence that the company failed to abide by its policy, there was no evidence that the
plaintiff was aware of the policy and thus, no evidence that a misrepresentation was a
producing cause of damages to the plaintiff).
187. 1 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
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tions be both a cause-in-fact and a substantial factor of the plaintiff's inju-
ries.188 Given the "multiplicity of factors" that inform an insurer's
decision to raise insurance premiums, the court concluded that, as a mat-
ter of law, the construction company's damages were too remote to be
actionable under the DTPA. 189
The plaintiff in Etheridge v. Oak Creek Mobile Homes, Inc.190 pur-
chased a mobile home that, when delivered, did not conform to the speci-
fications she had ordered and had numerous defects that were never
properly repaired. The plaintiff sued the mobile home manufacturer and
dealer for violations of the DTPA and common law misrepresentation.' 91
At trial, she testified that the mobile home dealer had informed her that
the mobile home was a "Cadillac" and, after the problems developed,
assured her that he would see that the repairs were taken care of prop-
erly. After the plaintiff prevailed at trial, the dealer sought a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that his actions were not a
producing cause of the plaintiff's damages. 192 The Beaumont Court of
Appeals determined that the plaintiff's testimony amounted to more than
a scintilla of evidence that the dealer's acts were the producing cause of
the plaintiff's damages. 193 But because the plaintiff was not allowed to
testify as to damages, the appeals court reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial.1 94
In some situations, the plaintiff's burden of proving producing cause is
aided by a presumption. In Stewart v. Transit Mix Concrete & Materials
Co., 195 the plaintiff was injured by concrete he had purchased to repair
his driveway. He sued the concrete manufacturer under the DTPA and
other theories for failure to warn that the concrete could cause burns
upon contact with the skin. The invoice for the concrete contained warn-
ings for various products but did not expressly reference the product the
plaintiff purchased. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment,
contending there was no evidence of causation. 96
The Texarkana Court of Appeals noted that in failure-to-warn cases in
which no warning is provided, the plaintiff is entitled to a presumption
that the warning would have been followed had it been provided. 197
When a warning is given but arguably is inadequate, no presumption
arises if the warning given would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries
188. Id. at 814.
189. Id.
190. 989 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
191. See id. at 414.
192. Id. at 419.
193. See id. See also Norwest Mortgage, Inc. v. Salinas, 999 S.W.2d 846, 859 (Tex.
App.- Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (holding that mortgagee's failure to obtain lien waiv-
ers before disbursing funds and failure to properly supervise disbursement of funds was a
producing cause of damages suffered by homeowners whose home was left unfinished by
builder).
194. See Etheridge, 989 S.W.2d at 419.
195. 988 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
196. See id. at 254.
197. See id. at 256.
[Vol. 53
D TPA
had it been read and heeded. 198 This is arises because the warning, al-
though inadequate, could not have been the cause in fact of the harm. 199
In this case, the summary judgment evidence raised a fact issue regarding
whether a warning was given that applied to the product purchased by
the plaintiff.20 0 The court therefore was unable to determine as a matter
of law whether the plaintiff could avail himself of the presumption, and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 201
E. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In one DTPA case decided during the reporting period, a defendant
argued that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of frauds. In
Moritz v. Bueche,202 former law students sued under the DTPA alleging
that the defendant and his son made misrepresentations to them. The
defendant argued that his alleged promise to give financial assistance to
the law school amounted to a promise to answer for the debt of another
and thus was unenforceable because it was not in writing.20 3 The San
Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that the statute of frauds was inap-
plicable because the plaintiffs' claims were for statutory DTPA violations.
Although some Texas courts have applied the statute of frauds to certain
DTPA claims, the courts doing so "look at the relationship of the alleged
promise to the purpose of the statute of frauds and the nature of the
damages sought. 20 4 In the case before the court, the students did not
seek contract damages, i.e., the benefit of their bargain. Rather, they
sought return of their tuition, fees, time and income, damages for mental
anguish, and exemplary damages. The court held that those damages in-
dicated that the suit was not one to enforce a debt and that such claims
were not barred by the statute of frauds.205
F. WAIVER
The DTPA specifically limits the circumstances in which parties can
effectively waive the statute's protections. 20 6 A waiver is void as contrary
to public policy unless it is conspicuous, in bold-face type, and identified
as a waiver, and the consumer has signed the waiver and was represented
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 257.
201. See id. at 257-58.
202. 980 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.); see supra notes 12-14 and
accompanying text.
203. See id. at 856.
204. Id.
205. See id. The court alternatively held that the statute of frauds was inapplicable
because the students alleged that the defendant had an interest in the outcome of the
school and because the students were alleging promises to them, not promises to guarantee
another's debt. See id.; see also Munawar v. The Cadle Co., 2 S.W.3d 12, 16-18 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (holding that neither the doctrine of merger nor
the use of a special warranty deed precludes a DTPA claim arising from a sale of real
estate).
206. See DTPA § 17.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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by counsel in seeking or acquiring the goods or services at issue.20 7
The defendant in Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Security Sys-
tems, Inc.,208 sought summary judgment on the plaintiff's DTPA claims
based upon a contractual limitation of liability. The defendant was the
corporate successor to a company that had installed security and fire
alarm systems in the plaintiff's commercial garage. After acquiring the
predecessor alarm company, the defendant continued to service the
maintenance contracts for the garage's alarm systems. Thereafter a fire
at the garage failed to trigger the smoke detectors but eventually set off
the burglar alarms. The garage sustained in excess of $450,000 in
damages. 209
The garage sued, alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of im-
plied and express warranties and violations of the DTPA.210 The garage
alleged that the defendant had violated the DTPA by making material
misrepresentations, breaching express and implied warranties, and engag-
ing in an unconscionable course of conduct. 211 The defendant moved for
summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the garage's dam-
ages were contractually limited to $350 by a clause in the installment con-
tracts for the alarm systems. 21 2
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that a limitation of liability clause
like the one in the contracts between the parties213 is insufficient to waive
liability for DTPA "laundry list" violations or an "unconscionable action
or course of action. '214 Turning to the garage's warranty claims, the court
recognized that there is an exception to the "no waiver" rules for DTPA
claims premised on breach of an express or implied warranty.215 Limita-
tion of liability clauses are enforceable against DTPA express warranty
claims "because the warranty becomes part of the basis of the bargain
between the parties. '216 Thus, summary judgment was appropriate on
the garage's DTPA express warranty claim.217 An implied warranty
claim, in contrast, is subject to a limitation of liability clause only if it is
one that can be disclaimed under the common law or the statute creating
it.218 Because the implied warranty claim at issue-the implied warranty
that work or services would be performed in a good and workmanlike
207. See id.
208. 997 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
209. See id. at 807.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 807-08.
213. Although the clause in the contract was defined as "Liquidated Damages and In-
demnification," the court held that it was really a limitation of liability as it limited liability
to $350 rather than fixing liability at a specific amount or at a specific percentage of a
service charge. See id. at 809-10.
214. Id. at 811.
215. Id. at 812.
216. Id. (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 576-77 (Tex.
1991)).
217. See id. at 812, 814.
218. See id. at 812.
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manner-may not be waived or disclaimed, 219 the court held that the lim-
itation of liability clause was not effective against the DTPA implied war-
ranty claim.220
G. NOTICE
Before filing a DTPA claim, the consumer must notify the defendant in
writing of the consumer's complaint as well as the amount of economic
damages, damages for mental anguish, and attorneys' fees and other ex-
penses. 221 If a consumer files suit without providing the required notice,
the defendant is entitled to abatement of the action until sixty days after
proper notice is sent.222
The Texas Supreme Court examined the adequacy of notice in a class
action context in In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo. 23 Buyers of vehicles had
brought a class action suit against 636 motor vehicle dealerships alleging
that by passing on their inventory taxes to consumers as an itemized
charge, the dealerships had committed fraud, conspiracy and DTPA vio-
lations. As the buyers had not sent DTPA notices before filing suit, the
dealerships filed pleas in abatement. The buyers then sent belated no-
tices demanding that the dealerships reimburse any consumer who paid
an itemized inventory or similar tax since January 1, 1994. The notice
also required reimbursement of expenses. The trial court denied the
dealerships' motion to abate, and the dealerships sought mandamus relief
in the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that the belated notices were inade-
quate because they sought relief for the class, not just the named
plaintiffs. 224
The Texas Supreme Court denied mandamus relief.225 The court first
noted that as originally enacted in 1973, the DTPA specifically authorized
a plaintiff to give notice on behalf of an uncertified class. 226 Although
this provision has been repealed, the court agreed with the several com-
mentators who have suggested that the legislature's likely motive for the
change was the court's own revision of the Texas civil procedure rule gov-
erning class actions.227 The court then rejected the dealerships' argument
that the legislature intended to abolish DTPA class actions.228 The court
found no evidence of such a legislative intent, holding that "the DTPA
permits a consumer to provide preliminary notice on behalf of a putative
219. See id. at 812-13 (citing Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 355
(Tex. 1987)).
220. Arthur's Garage, 997 S.W.2d at 812-13. The court nevertheless held that summary
judgment was appropriate on the claim because there was no evidence that the defendant
ever repaired or modified the smoke detector. See id. at 813-14.
221. See DTPA § 17.505(a).
222. See id. § 17.505(d)-(e).
223. 997 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1999).
224. See id. at 176.
225. See id. at 185.
226. See id. at 177.
227. See id.
228. See id. 177-78.
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class."'229 As the buyers had served adequate notice, the dealerships' mo-
tions to abate were properly denied,2 30 and their request for mandamus
relief was similarly denied.231
H. LIMITATIONS
Under the DTPA's limitations provision, an "action must be com-
menced within two years after the date on which the false, misleading, or
deceptive act or practice occurred or within two years after the consumer
discovered or should in the exercise of reasonable diligence have discov-
ered the occurrence of the false, misleading, or deceptive act or
practice. '232
The Texas Supreme Court examined DTPA limitations in KPMG Peat
Marwick v. Harrison County Housing Finance Corp.2 33 The plaintiff, a
county housing finance corporation, contracted for auditing services from
the defendant accounting firm in connection with a series of bonds issued
by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had sued the trustee of the bonds for wrong-
doing in a prior suit but lost on summary judgment. The plaintiff then
sued the accounting firm, alleging that it had failed to disclose the trus-
tee's wrongdoing, and raised claims of negligence and DTPA violations.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on
limitations grounds but the Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the defendant had not presented conclusive evidence that the
plaintiff had discovered or should have discovered the wrongful act more
than two years prior to filing suit. 234 The court of appeals held that a
claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows not only of the injury but
also of the "specific nature of each wrongful act that may have caused the
injury. '2 35 The Texas Supreme Court rejected this accrual test, applied
the rule that a DTPA claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the wrongfully caused injury, and reversed.2 36 The court
held that once the plaintiff was aware of the harm suffered, the plaintiff
should have investigated why its auditor failed to discover or report the
mismanagement that caused the harm.237
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals examined the effect of the
DTPA's limitations period on claims brought by insureds against their
229. Id. at 177-78.
230. Pursuant to DTPA section 17.505, the dealerships' plea in abatement had automat-
ically abated the action. By the time the trial court ruled, more than sixty days had passed
since the dealerships received adequate, if belated, DTPA notices. Thus, no further abate-
ment was necessary. See id.
231. See id. at 179.
232. DTPA § 17.565.
233. 988 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1999).
234. See id. at 747.
235. Id. at 749.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 750. See also Esquivel v. Murray Guard Inc., 992 S.W.2d 536, 541 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (holding that limitations begin to run when
the fact of injury is known, not when the alleged wrongdoers are identified).
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insurers in Pena v. State Farm Lloyds238 and Duzich v. Marine Office of
America Corp.2 3 9 In Pena, the insureds brought suit against their home-
owner's insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, unfair settlement prac-
tices and violation of the DTPA. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the insurer and the plaintiffs appealed arguing, among other
things, that their claims were not time-barred. The Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals agreed. The court held that limitations begin to run in con-
nection with a DTPA claim arising from denial of coverage on the date
the coverage is denied, but timely claims for additional payments may
restart the limitations period.240 Because the insureds had made several
related claims on their policy, the court held the relevant date for limita-
tions purposes was the date the insureds' additional claims were finally
denied.241 Since that date was less than two years before suit was filed,
the insureds' claims were not barred.242 Applying the same test to a dif-
ferent set of facts in Duzich, the court held that the plaintiff's claims were
barred by limitations because the final denial of the insured's claims oc-
curred more than two years prior to suit, and the plaintiff was unable to
identify any particular misrepresentations or deceptive actions that oc-
curred within the applicable limitations period.243
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In two decisions handed down during the survey period, the Houston
and San Antonio Courts of Appeals underscored the principle that
DTPA claims are subject to the same due process analysis generally appli-
cable to attempts by Texas plaintiffs to obtain personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents. In C-Loc Retention Systems, Inc. v. Hendrix,244 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals rejected an attempt by a Texas buyer of "bulkhead-
ing materials" to obtain jurisdiction over a Michigan seller. At the time
of the purchase, the plaintiff and defendant had traded several telephone
calls and faxes. The defendant shipped the goods F.O.B. Michigan, and
after problems arose with the materials, the defendant sent a representa-
tive to Texas to examine the goods and report back. Rejecting the
buyer's claim that these facts established specific jurisdiction, the Hous-
ton court held that although the shipment F.O.B. Michigan was not itself
determinative, this fact, combined with the defendant's lack of advertis-
ing in Texas or other activities directed toward the state, failed to estab-
lish the necessary minimum contacts with Texas to assert personal
jurisdiction. In so holding, the court characterized the trip by the seller's
representative as an "isolated-occurrence" in relation to the plaintiff's
238. 980 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. ext. filed).
239. 980 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied).
240. See Pena, 980 S.W.2d at 954.
241, See id.
242. See id.
243. See Duzich, 980 S.W.2d at 869.
244. 993 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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complaint.2 45 Inasmuch as the plaintiff attempted to establish specific ju-
risdiction rather than general jurisdiction over the defendant, this expla-
nation seems less than wholly satisfactory. The absence of any deceptive
acts arising during the Texas visit would, on the other hand, support the
court's conclusion.
Lastly, the plaintiff in Klenk v. Bustamante246 brought an action for
legal malpractice and DTPA violations against his former employer's cor-
porate attorneys, who were located at the company's New York head-
quarters. The trial court denied the attorneys' special appearance, and
the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that the at-
torneys' long-distance representation of the plaintiff did not constitute
sufficient contact with Texas even if the attorneys communicated with,
and provided legal advice to, the plaintiff in Texas via telephone.2 47
VI. CONCLUSION
In this millennium year,248 the reported DTPA decisions illustrate the
changing nature of the Texas economy. Of the 44 decisions selected for
this annual review, 21 involved services, 10 involved insurance and 10
involved consumer goods. The statistical predominance of cases involv-
ing services is consistent with past years. Of the 74 cases reported in the
two immediately preceding surveys, only 10 involved consumer goods,
compared to 32 involving services and 13 involving insurance.2 49 The
transformation of Texas-like the United States generally-to a service
economy is powerfully reflected in the case law.
It is possible to overstate the significance of such statistics. One might
reasonably expect cases involving "garden variety" fraud in "traditional"
consumer transactions to be less likely to produce published appellate
opinions (and to be selected for this survey) than those involving novel
theories of liability or defense. Indeed, the short history of DTPA juris-
prudence might be written as one of constant tension between the forces
of expansion and retrenchment. To cite a recent example, a plausible
case can be made that the 1995 exemption for professional services was
made necessary by overly-expansive applications of the DTPA's defini-
tional provisions. According to this line of argument, it strains the com-
mon meaning of the terms "false, misleading or deceptive" to embrace
advice, opinions, or the exercise of judgment, which by nature are subjec-
tive and generally incapable of being empirically proven "true" or
245. Id. at 479.
246. 993 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
247. See id. at 682-83.
248. Technically, this could be characterized as a "false, misleading or deceptive" state-
ment. See DTPA § 17.46 (Vernon 1987). Because under the Gregorian Calendar there is
no year zero, the first year of the calendar ended at the end of 1 A.D., and the first century
elapsed at the end of 100 A.D. By extension, the Third Millennium and the 21st century
will begin at zero hours GMT on January 1, 2001. See Royal Observatory of Greenwich,
Special Information Leaflet No. 29: "The New Millennium," <http://www.rog.nmm.ac.uk/
leaflets/newmill.html>.
249. The balance of cases involved real estate and non-consumer goods.
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"false." Just as the expression of an opinion is not generally considered
to be a "false statement," and hence not actionable as defamation,250 ren-
dering advice or expressing of an opinion should not normally qualify as
"false, misleading or deceptive," as the court properly recognized in
Douglas v. Delp.25 1
Relatedly, comparison of the decisions in Griggs v. State Farm
Lloyds252 and Holeman v. Landmark Chevrolet Corp.253 decisions sug-
gests that pretrial dismissal of claims involving obvious "puffery" could
avoid protracted litigation over such vexing issues as whether the plain-
tiff's offer to enter into a consumer transaction was made in "good faith,"
a requirement nowhere found in the DTPA, yet one that some courts
have found necessary to filigree onto the standing inquiry in order to
avoid absurd results.254
The current crop of cases indicates that the question of consumer
standing is one that continues to bedevil the courts. A recurring scenario
involves a plaintiff not in contractual privity with the defendant.255 Pro-
ceeding from the premise that contractual privity is not a prerequisite to
DTPA standing, some courts have suggested that the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant is irrelevant to the standing determina-
tion.256 The logical fallacy in such dicta was recognized by the Supreme
Court in Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,257 in which the court held that
there must be a "connection between the plaintiffs, their transactions,
and the defendants' conduct. '258 Other decisions recognize that the rela-
tionships of both plaintiff and defendant to the transaction in issue are
relevant to consumer standing.259
Causation of damages is another subject that deserves more exacting
scrutiny in the standing analysis. Although it is said that foreseeability is
not an element of producing cause under the DTPA,260 it is equally true
250. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). An exception to
this rule is a defamatory opinion that implies the existence of underlying defamatory facts.
See id.
251. 987 S.W.2d 879, 884-85 (Tex. 1999).
252. 181 F.3d 694, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1999).
253. 989 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
254. See id. at 398.
255. See, e.g., Moritz v. Bueche, 980 S.W.2d 849, 855 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no
pet.); Guest v. Cochran, 993 S.W.2d 397, 407 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no
pet.); Flameout Design Fabrication, Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 838
(Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
256. See, e.g., Moritz, 980 S.W.2d at 855.
257. 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996); see also Flameout, 994 S.W.2d at 838.
258. Amstad, 919 S.W.2d at 650 (citing Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 747
S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. 1987) for the proposition that "a plaintiff establishes standing to sue
under the DTPA in terms of her relationship to a transaction"). See also Sanchez v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999).
259. See Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W. 2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983);
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981); Inglish v. Union State
Bank, 911 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 945
S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997).




that DTPA damages cannot be too remote.261 Stated another way, the
requirement that a producing cause be an "efficient" or "exciting"
cause262 necessarily implies a more "proximate" relationship than mere
but-for causation.
Because the universe of possible relationships between DTPA plaintiffs
and defendants is so vast, it is not surprising that efforts to fashion stand-
ing rules of general applicability frequently have produced irrational re-
sults. A more profitable inquiry might be to focus upon the parties'
relationship in light of the DTPA's stated purpose-i.e., to "protect con-
sumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business practices, uncon-
scionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and
economical procedures to secure such protection. '2 63 An analogue to
such an approach is found in the principles that govern standing under
the antitrust laws-another statutory scheme with a stated purpose of ad-
vancing consumer welfare. 264 It is generally accepted that, at a minimum,
antitrust standing requires proof of (1) injury-in-fact, (2) "by reason of"
that which made the conduct an antitrust violation, (3) proximity to the
violation, and (4) reasonably quantifiable damages.265 The first and
fourth requirements are self-explanatory; the second requires that the in-
jury not only be caused by the violation but also that it be caused by that
which made the defendant's conduct unlawful (i.e., that redress of the
injury would promote the statute's purpose), 266 and the third requires
that the plaintiff's injury not be too remote from the conduct constituting
the violation.267
Like the antitrust laws, the DTPA may be read to require proof of in-
jury caused by the violation that matches the rationale for the violation,
and a relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
injury. If the plaintiff's injury is not caused by the defendant's conduct,
"but for" causation is absent. If the plaintiff's injury is not caused "by
reason of" that which makes the defendant's conduct unlawful, the re-
quirement that the plaintiff's injury be "in connection with" the violation
likewise should be deemed absent. And if the plaintiff's injury is too re-
mote from the alleged violation, standing should be denied. Such an ana-
lytical approach serves to rationalize the DTPA standing inquiry by
avoiding the artificial (and sometimes contradictory) classifications in-
volved in parsing the pseudo-privity and foreseeability issues that con-
tinue to confound standing analysis in DTPA cases.
261. See id.
262. See Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975).
263. DTPA § 17.44 (1973).
264. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (describing the Sherman
Act as a "consumer welfare prescription").
265. See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 360
(1995) [hereinafter AREEDA]; see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542-44 (1983).
266. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
267. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 542-44; AREEDA, supra note 263,
360.
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